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Abstract
Computers that negotiate on our behalf hold great
promise for the future and will even become indis-
pensable in emerging application domains such as
the smart grid and the Internet of Things. Much re-
search has thus been expended to create agents that
are able to negotiate in an abundance of circum-
stances. However, up until now, truly autonomous
negotiators have rarely been deployed in real-world
applications. This paper sizes up current negotiat-
ing agents and explores a number of technological,
societal and ethical challenges that autonomous ne-
gotiation systems have brought about. The ques-
tions we address are: in what sense are these sys-
tems autonomous, what has been holding back their
further proliferation, and is their spread something
we should encourage? We relate the automated ne-
gotiation research agenda to dimensions of auton-
omy and distill three major themes that we believe
will propel autonomous negotiation forward: accu-
rate representation, long-term perspective, and user
trust. We argue these orthogonal research direc-
tions need to be aligned and advanced in unison to
sustain tangible progress in the field.
1 Introduction
Negotiation, the process of joint decision making, is perva-
sive in our society. Whenever actors meet and influence each
other to forge a mutually beneficial agreement, a form of ne-
gotiation is at work [Young, 1991].
Negotiation arises in almost every social and organiza-
tional setting, yet many avoid it out of fear or lack of skill and
this contributes to income inequality, political gridlock and
social injustice [Eisenberg and Lanvers, 2009]. This has led
to an increasing focus on the design of autonomous negotia-
tors capable of automatically and independently negotiating
with others.
Automated negotiation research is fueled by a number of
benefits that computerized negotiation can offer, including
better (win-win) deals, and reduction in time, costs, stress
and cognitive effort on the part of the user. Moreover, au-
tonomous negotiation will soon become not just desired but
required in instances where the human scale is simply too
slow and expensive. For instance, with the world-wide de-
ployment of the smart electrical grid and the must for renew-
able energy sources, flexible devices in our household will
soon (re-)negotiate complex energy contracts automatically.
Another example is the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT),
which will introduce countless smart, interconnected devices
that autonomously negotiate the usage of sensitive data and
make trade-offs between privacy concerns, price, and conve-
nience.
To properly fulfill its representational role in an ever-
dynamic environment, a negotiation agent has to balance and
adhere to different aspects of autonomous behavior, including
self-reliance and the capability and freedom to perform its ac-
tions, while at the same time remaining interdependent in its
joint activity with the user. While many successes have been
achieved in advancing various degrees of autonomy in nego-
tiating agents, it is readily apparent that fully-deployed and
truly autonomous negotiators are still a thing of the future.
Continued development will be required before agents will
be able to forge even mundane agreements such as the per-
sonalized renewal of our energy or mobile phone contracts.
This begs the obvious question: what is still lacking currently
and what is needed for autonomous negotiators to be able to
fulfill their promise?
This paper discusses the challenges and upcoming applica-
tion domains for (almost) entirely autonomous negotiation on
people’s behalf. We describe the technological challenges as-
sociated with these future domains and provide a roadmap
towards full autonomy, together with stops along the way,
highlighting what we deem important solution concepts for
enabling future autonomous negotiation systems. As a basis
for our discussion, we provide a unifying view of autonomous
negotiation based on three orthogonal dimensions of auton-
omy that research has focused on so far: being self-sufficient,
self-directed, and interdependent. We argue that automated
negotiation opportunities of tomorrow are calling for a com-
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bined effort in addressing these three pillars of a negotiator’s
autonomy.
This paper does not aim to survey all research or challenges
in the field comprehensively, but rather presents pointers to
what we consider important focal points for autonomous ne-
gotiation, now and in the future. We pinpoint and elaborate on
the following major challenges for autonomous negotiation:
1. Domain knowledge and preference elicitation;
2. Long-term perspective; and
3. User trust and adoption.
Lastly, this paper also pays homage to the 2001 landmark
publication by Jennings et al. and asks what has happened,
16 years later, with the prospects and challenges of automated
negotiation. We examine which main challenges have been
addressed, and which stay relevant in a world that offers more
opportunities for automated negotiation than ever before.
2 The Autonomy Diagonal of Negotiation
Autonomous negotiation is more than just automated nego-
tiation; it is the freedom to negotiate independently. Rather
than being uni-dimensional, autonomy incorporates at least
two components [Bradshaw et al., 2003]: self-sufficiency
(the capability of the actor to take care of itself) and self-
directedness (the freedom to act within the environment and
the means to reach goals). Following [Johnson et al., 2011]
we distinguish a third dimension called support for interde-
pendence – being able to work with others and influence and
be influenced by team members.1
We can distinguish three strands of research in automated
negotiation that each cluster around one of the three dimen-
sions of autonomy (Fig. 1):
Negotiation support systems.
These systems are designed to assist and train people in
negotiation. Some of these systems, such as the Inspire
system [Kersten and Lo, 2001], have been widely employed
in real-life. However, while negotiation support systems
enable interdependence by design, humans predominately
supervise and make decisions on the appropriate outcome,
which results in low self-sufficiency and self-directedness.
Game theoretical approaches and trading bots.
Game theory’s dominant concern is with fully rational
players and what each should optimally do. This approach
is therefore called symmetrically prescriptive [Sebenius,
1992]. The focus is on either equilibrium strategies or
protocols that can guarantee a good outcome for both players
through mechanism design [Young, 1991]. Agents have
a reduced scope for self-directedness in such settings, as
they are relatively simple and need to conform to certain
strategies (e.g. to bid truthfully in an auction). Similarly,
1Note that the notion of autonomy is notoriously difficult to cap-
ture (see [Johnson et al., 2011] for an overview). We are concerned
here with those aspects especially relevant for negotiation and for
their autonomy in relation to their environment; an alternative, more
self-contained definition, for example, is an agent’s ability to gener-
ate its own goals [Luck et al., 2003].
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Figure 1: By and large, negotiation research can be clustered around
one of the three main orthogonal dimensions of autonomy: self-
sufficiency, self-directedness, and interdependence. The efforts of
the three need to be integrated to arrive at truly autonomous nego-
tiators that can progress along the autonomy diagonal.
real-world trading bots mostly employ simple rule-based
functions which have been hard-coded in advance. Examples
of this type are among the most advanced autonomous
negotiators in terms of self-sufficiency, such as high fre-
quency trading agents for financial exchanges, advertising
exchanges, or sniping agents used in eBay [Hu and Bolivar,
2008]. While these approaches are able to function with-
out human intervention and can be highly self-sufficient,
they are constrained in terms of freedom to direct the process.
Negotiation analytical approaches.
Negotiation analysis prescribes how players should act given
a description of how others will act. That is, this field is
concerned with an asymmetrical prescriptive/descriptive
view of autonomous negotiation [Sebenius, 1992]. Much
research on what are often dubbed simply ‘negotiation
agents’ (or ‘heuristics’ in game theory literature) falls into
this category; e.g. all negotiation agents from the annual
automated negotiation competition [Baarslag et al., 2015].
A key feature of this approach is the agent’s ability to make
judgment calls without intervention (i.e. to construct beliefs
based on partial information and act in best response to this
belief, typically over opponent types or strategies), while the
agent’s preferences are often considered externally given.
This locates the negotiation analytical approach around the
self-directed axis.
As can be gleaned from the fields indicated above, au-
tonomous negotiation has garnered attention from different
research directions and has managed to advance in key as-
pects of autonomous behavior. As a result, we now have ne-
gotiators that exist independently in the real world, delegated
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Major challenge Main autonomy
dimensions
Building blocks Example opportunities Solutions roadmap
Domain knowledge and
preference elicitation
(Section 3.1)
Self-sufficiency &
Interdependence
Preference elicitation on-the-fly Privacy and IoT Value of information indicators, robust
performance estimates
Domain modeling Smart grids Separate user/agent domain models,
expert mappings
Long-term perspective
(Section 3.2)
Self-sufficiency &
Self-directedness
Repeated interactions Communities, smart homes, autonomous
driving
Temporally integrative negotiations,
reputation metrics
Non-stationary preferences B2B, entertainment booking Cost-efficient tracking, context-
dependent models, preference dynam-
ics
User trust and adoption
(Section 3.3)
Self-directedness &
Interdependence
Acceptability and participation Conflict resolution, customer retainment Co-creation, adjustable autonomy,
transfer of control
Transparent consequences Sharing economy, decentralized market-
places
Transparency and openness, worst-
case bounds, risk measures
Table 1: Overview of major challenges in autonomous negotiation and the main dimensions of autonomy to which they relate. Each challenge
is subdivided in building blocks along with example opportunities and a solution roadmap.
with a gamut of available strategies to freely choose among,
and that can engage in supportive interdependence; just not
all at the same time.
This may explain why it has proven difficult to extend the
progress made in this field to truly representative negotiat-
ing agents. Of course we acknowledge that to a lesser de-
gree, combined work on all dimensions has been performed
(as depicted by the three-colored cube in Figure 1); we sim-
ply argue that the main automated negotiation research lines
have developed in parallel to one of the three autonomy direc-
tions. Research-wise, it is unquestionably a sound strategy to
first explore the autonomy axes in separation. As Figure 1
suggests, we can make substantive progress in autonomous
negotiation by continuing to advance along the autonomy di-
agonal, which has inspired the focal points of the challenges
we present in the next section.
3 Major Challenges
The various aspects of autonomy drive three major open
challenges for autonomous negotiation, of which the over-
all theme can be summarized as trusted and sustained rep-
resentation. We describe the challenges and their building
blocks below, together with a number of explicit opportuni-
ties in each case (see Table 1 for an overview).
Just like autonomy itself, each challenge outlined here is
multi-dimensional; i.e., each challenge pertains to at least two
dimensions of autonomy, thereby providing the impetus to
further advance along the autonomy diagonal. Note that many
of these challenges intersect and cannot be entirely untangled;
for example, adequate user preference extraction will not only
increase the user model accuracy, but may also boost user
trust.
3.1 Domain Knowledge and Preference Elicitation
Co-dependence between user and agent requires that they
synchronize their world model. This requirement relates
mainly to the agent’s self-sufficiency and interdependence,
which can be enhanced by imparting the agent with accurate
and timely user preferences about the negotiation process and
co-constructing the real-world intricacies of the domain.
Preference elicitation on-the-fly
In order to faithfully represent the user, an autonomous nego-
tiator needs to engage with the user to make sure it constructs
an accurate preference model (see e.g. [Hunter, 2015]). How-
ever, users are often unwilling or unable to engage with a
negotiation system, and hence prudence needs to be exer-
cised when interacting with the user to avoid elicitation fa-
tigue. This is especially important in domains where people
are notably reluctant to engage with the system at length, for
instance in privacy negotiations.
As a consequence, automated negotiators of the future are
required to not only strike deals with limited available user
information, but also to assess which additional informa-
tion should be elicited from the user, while minimizing user
bother [Baarslag and Kaisers, 2017]. This challenge is still as
relevant (and for the most part still unaddressed) as when it
was raised in [Jennings et al., 2001]. However, as a way for-
ward, we believe future research should particularly empha-
size preference elicitation on-the-fly: that is, active preference
extraction during negotiation(s). Potential benefits include a
significantly reduced initial preference elicitation phase (as
featured in many negotiation support systems) and the ability
to select the most informative query to pose to the user at the
most relevant time.
To facilitate this, new performance-based metrics are re-
quired that can assess how supplementary preference infor-
mation influences negotiation performance. Adaptive utility
elicitation models provide a good starting point for represent-
ing probabilistic utility-based preferences that allow for in-
cremental updating over time (e.g. using Bayesian reason-
ing), in the vein of [Chajewska et al., 2000]. The viability of
a negotiation query can for instance be measured in terms of
the expected value of information [Boutilier, 2002] in order
to assess the marginal utility of altering belief states.
Another challenge is for a negotiation strategy to deter-
mine its actions effectively in light of its imprecise informa-
tion state. Techniques for decision making under uncertainty
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could assist in this and could thereby give rise to novel ne-
gotiation strategy concepts, for instance by incorporating the
notion of expected expected utility [Boutilier, 2003] to ex-
press the expected negotiation payoff over all possible instan-
tiations of the user model.
The above discussion largely follows the standard assump-
tions of rational choice theory: i.e. that people’s preferences
can be accurately elicited. Unfortunately, several idiosyn-
crasies of human psychology complicate these assumptions.
Not only do people often have difficulty explicitly expressing
their preferences, a person’s willingness to accept an agree-
ment is also only partially determined by how they feel about
the final agreement. For example, Curhan’s Subjective Value
Inventory [Curhan et al., 2006] identifies four factors that pre-
dict which agreements people will accept. Besides feelings
about the material outcome (e.g., “the extent to which the
terms of the agreement benefit you”), agreements are shaped
by feelings about the self (e.g., “did you lose face”), feel-
ings about the process (e.g., “did the counterpart listen to
your concerns”) and feelings about the relationship (e.g., “did
the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relation-
ship”).
Research also illustrates that elicited utility functions are
highly sensitive to subtle contextual factors. For example,
framing effects emphasize that preferences between outcomes
can reverse depending on whether they are seen as losses or
gains with respect to some reference point. In a negotiation,
the reference point is often the perceived value that the other
party receives, even though this knowledge doesn’t change
the individual’s objective outcome. As a result, outcomes
can be readily manipulated simply by changing the form and
nature of information conveyed [Gratch et al., 2016]. More
broadly, valuations in a negotiation are shaped by emotion,
including emotions that arise from the process, but also be-
liefs about what other parties feel (see, e.g., [Barry et al.,
2004]). Given the highly context-sensitive nature of on-the-
fly preference elicitation, such considerations will have to be
taken into account in its design and implementation.
Domain modeling
The quality of the negotiation outcome depends not only on
the faithfulness of the preference model of an autonomous ne-
gotiator, but also on the accuracy of the domain model. The
old ‘garbage in, garbage out’ truism applies here, as the qual-
ity of the offered solution depends so heavily on a correct
domain description.
However, domain modeling, and certainly formal model-
ing, is an expertise that cannot be expected from an arbi-
trary user. Therefore, users require either expert guidance,
or explicit domain modeling support. Modeling in close co-
operation with a domain expert runs the risk of perpetuating
people’s uncertainty about the model, thereby limiting their
ability to make necessary adjustments. When modeling sup-
port is provided by the system, the knowledge representation
language used will be inherently simple as it has to be un-
derstood by arbitrary negotiators. This is especially impor-
tant in domains where users employ automated negotiation
without any expertise, such as in the smart grid, which can
result in the wrong evaluation of bids. Highly accurate mod-
els, on the other hand, also have their disadvantages: they
can display complex non-linearities [Lopez-Carmona et al.,
2012], in which case even assessing the utility of a proposal
can prove NP-hard [de Jonge et al., 2015].
This inspires the following open research question: what is
the impact of simplifying the domain and preference mod-
els to keep the layman user on board? An answer might
come from using two models, as suggested in [Hindriks et
al., 2008]: an accurate, but complex one that serves as a refer-
ence model for the agent, and a more comprehensive one for
interaction with the user. Proper clarification and explanation
could then be elicited from a process of co-creation [Sanders
and Stappers, 2008] or participatory design [Simonsen and
Robertson, 2012] between modeling experts and domain ex-
perts. Ideally, a reflecting phase should be included during
and after negotiations, in which the human (and perhaps even-
tually the agent) can provide feedback to allow for long-term
co-evolution.
The above points also apply to the appropriateness and
understandability of the protocol governing the negotiation.
Typically, a pre-negotiation phase provides an opportunity for
the negotiation parties to engage in a debate about what pro-
tocol to employ. A corresponding challenge is to construct
a best practice repository for negotiation techniques, as men-
tioned in [Jennings et al., 2001]. This has been tackled at least
partially through recent efforts in creating a negotiation hand-
book for negotiation protocols [Marsa-Maestre et al., 2013].
Whatever approach is chosen, experts in formal modeling
will be needed to instantiate a domain model that sufficiently
captures all salient features. Those experts are pivotal to the
negotiation agent business model and will be responsible for
mapping user-understandable interests to the negotiation is-
sues within complex domains. These are likely to become
future jobs; i.e., real estate agents informing procurement
agents of the future. Relevant research areas, and courses for
training these experts, will be on collaborative and supportive
modeling.
3.2 Long-term Perspective
Given the effort involved in domain modeling and prefer-
ence elicitation, the opportunities for automated negotiation
are even clearer in domains where an agent frequently faces
similar negotiation situations. Most research on negotiation
agents, however, has focused on single encounters. The dif-
ferent challenges and opportunities for such long-term nego-
tiations hinge on the volatility of both the opponent pool and
the user’s preferences.
Repeated encounters
There are many propitious opportunities for applying nego-
tiation in repeated encounters. For example, in community
energy exchange [Alam et al., 2015], agents can trade energy
from storage and local sources between neighboring homes
and businesses. Another example is the smart home, where
different occupants will have different needs and preferences
and have to reach mutual agreements, e.g. about the tem-
perature of the house and the use of devices. Other settings,
in which the agent faces many different opponents, include
self-driving vehicles, where vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-
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to-infrastructure negotiation can play an important role (e.g.,
negotiating priority at intersections).
Negotiation opportunities for isolated encounters can be
very limited, since often a resource (e.g. electricity or giving
way) is needed without necessarily offering anything immedi-
ately in return (except possibly money or virtual currencies).
However, explicitly considering the temporal dimension al-
lows agents to receive or concede something now in return
for conceding or receiving the same resource later. In other
words, single-issue, distributive negotiations can be turned
into richer, multi-issue, integrative negotiations, with more
scope to achieve win-win solutions [Mell et al., 2015].
A significant challenge for long-term reciprocal encounters
is that future needs are often uncertain, and so it is difficult to
commit to giving up or requesting specific future resources.
Possible solutions involve money or virtual currencies which
can be redeemed at a later stage and can undergo temporal
discounting if necessary, but they do not address the distribu-
tive nature of multi-issue negotiation. They also introduce ad-
ditional challenges: using actual money requires an exchange
rate with the resources involved, while it may not be desirable
to introduce money in certain settings; e.g. when they rely,
to some degree, on unincentivized cooperation and altruistic
behavior. Virtual currencies (including distributed ledger ap-
proaches) can be traded bilaterally in a “like for like” manner,
addressing the exchange problem, but then other issues arise,
e.g. how much does each agent receive to begin with, what
happens if an agent runs out, and to what extent do they pro-
vide a real incentive if agents can go into debt without any
consequences?
Another possible solution is to rely on altruism and using
trust ratings and reputation systems to provide the desired in-
centives (e.g. using favors and ledgers [Mell et al., 2015]).
In such cases, ‘altruism’ can be a self-interested strategy if
this is reciprocated at a later state, possibly involving a differ-
ent opponent. While reputation mechanisms are well known
to incentivize cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, more re-
search on this is needed in the context of (repeated) automated
negotiation.
Unfortunately, negotiation methods that seek to identify ef-
ficient and fair (envy-free) agreements face, in addition to the
above, a number of psychological challenges. People adopt
a variety of interpretations as to what is fair and negotiations
often involve disputes over which principle to apply [Welsh,
2003]. For example, in the context of organ donation, the eq-
uity principle would allocate resources on the basis of ability,
effort or merit, the equality rule would treat individuals the
same, whereas the principle of need is usually achieved by
allocating according to individuals medical condition, socio-
economical status or other relevant needs. Other complica-
tions involve moral constraints on certain exchanges. For ex-
ample, it is considered morally repugnant to exchange money
for bodily organs, so an agreement that combines material in-
terests with sacred values may be seen as substantially worse
than an independent evaluation of these elements would sug-
gest [Dehghani et al., 2010].
Although these challenges might seem insurmountable,
there are several ways to incorporate these biases into con-
ventional computational methods. One approach is to incor-
porate psychological factors into the utility function. Indeed,
Fehr and Schmidt have shown how this can be done without
violating the basic tenets of utility theory [Fehr and Schmidt,
2006]. Some of the challenges with fairness can be addressed
by making the process more transparent (Section 3.3). An-
other approach is to incorporate modest psychological exten-
sions to rational methods. For example, framing effects can
be handled through the use of prospect theory (e.g., [Yang et
al., 2011]).
Non-stationary preferences
While short-lived instantiations of representational agents
may assume that there are some true and stationary prefer-
ences to be elicited from the user, in long-term negotiations,
these very preferences may evolve over the course of weeks
or months according to certain preference dynamics. If an
autonomous negotiator acts on elicited information for an ex-
tended period of time without accounting for existing drift in
preferences, it will erroneously fulfill outdated design objec-
tives. Even if the drop in performance is noticed by the user,
this leads to a plunge in user trust and adoption, or a de-facto
shortened time of deployment. This is a typical example of
opacity that can result from an excess of unchecked auton-
omy [Norman, 1990]. As a result, long-term negotiation re-
quires an increase in co-dependence, at the cost of throttled-
down self-directedness; e.g., by repeated assessment of the
preference representation quality, with intermittent elicitation
actions whenever their anticipated benefits exceed their costs.
This reframes the challenge posed in Section 3.1 of pref-
erence elicitation to cost-efficient tracking of non-stationary
preferences in long-term negotiation, with possible applica-
tions ranging from leisure bookings to business-to-business
(B2B) negotiations. Inspiration for tackling this challenge
may come from the area of news recommender systems,
which has embraced context-dependent models [Adomavi-
cius and Tuzhilin, 2015] and preference dynamics [Li et al.,
2014] in response to the inherent need to capture fast-paced
preference evolution. Such models have promising merit
for being transfered to negotiation strategies that balance the
preciseness of preference representation with relevant and
timely but costly elicitation, extending preliminary work in
that area [Baarslag and Kaisers, 2017].
3.3 User Trust and Adoption
While the agent depends on the user for knowledge and guid-
ance (as described in Section 3.1), the user relies on a self-
directed agent for a good outcome. To alleviate unwilling-
ness to relinquish control and to guarantee user satisfaction
with and adherence to the final outcome, the user needs to
trust the system through co-participation, transparency, and
proper representation.
User participation
Lessons learned from collaborative human-robot teams indi-
cate that it is important to be able to escalate to the meta-level
(i.e. have humans participate) when necessary [Feltovich et
al., 2012]. The need for escalating to a higher authority ap-
plies whenever a negotiator represents a group or a company
(e.g., a union, or stakeholder organizations in general). In
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such cases, the negotiator can only make deals that fall within
certain margins.
The idea of collaborative control, or mixed-initiative con-
trol (see e.g. [Fong et al., 2001; Feltovich et al., 2012]),
might become essential to obtain the most out of complex
negotiations. In this envisioned line of research, each negoti-
ation party consists of at least one human and one negotiation
agent. The agent should do the brunt of the negotiation work
to find possible agreements with the other negotiation parties
and which can presented to their human partners for feedback
and new input. The research challenge is to determine when,
how, and how often to switch the initiative from human to
agent and vice versa.
Transparent consequences
There is an inherent tension between increased self-
directedness and trust, which dampens the adoption of in-
creasingly autonomous negotiators: on the one hand, an au-
tonomous negotiatior’s relevance is directly proportional to
its ability to impact the user independently in meaningful
ways (e.g. fiscal, well-being, reputation, and so on); but, in
turn, the user’s trust and willingness to relinquish control is
conditional on understanding the agent’s reasoning and con-
sequences of its actions. The two can be reconciled by mak-
ing the outcome space more transparent to the user, and by
enabling the user to specify the permissible means in the
form of principles. The challenge is that the negotiation
agent’s reasoning abilities may very well exceed the domain
insights of a nonspecialist user, thus requiring a translation
from stochastic performance models of self-directed expert
reasoning into laymen terms that adequately convey expecta-
tions and risks.
Note that we suggest transparency as the key concept here,
which subsumes Jennings’ notion of predictability [Jennings
et al., 2001]. Predictability is essential towards the user to in-
still trust, but can be disastrous towards the opponent because
of the potential for exploitability. We argue unpredictable be-
havior is in fact desirable as a negotiation tactic as a confus-
ing and randomization device, as long as the consequences
are transparently explained to the user.
The uncertainty inherent in negotiation can be captured in
performance models and risk metrics, where the complexity
should be scaled to the criticality of the consequences for the
user. If the performance intervals are sub-critical, then sim-
ple guarantees on the range of possible outcomes may suffice
(such as price bounds provided by Uber for individual rides),
leaving it up to the user to build and judge the average perfor-
mance model; otherwise, measures of risk are required, such
as Conditional Value at Risk (CVar) [Shafie-khah et al., 2016]
In the end, the potency of autonomous negotiators is as
much contingent on the acceptance by their users as by
their counter-parties. The most promising incubators of au-
tonomous negotiators are ecosystems in which autonomous
agents provide a unique source of societal value that is dis-
tributed over all stakeholders, as in the application of demand
response for smart grids. Open platforms for value distribu-
tion have recently seen increased attention in flagship applica-
tions such as the cryptocurrency bitcoin and the decentralized
world wide web Blockstack [Ali et al., 2016]. The digital API
of these systems offers fertile grounds for a level playing field
for competition and may soon provide a common interface for
automated negotiators.
4 Concluding Observations
Autonomous systems that are capable of negotiating on our
behalf are among society’s key technological challenges for
the near future, and their uptake is important for many criti-
cal economical application areas. In this paper, we present a
roadmap to arrive at such representative and trusted negotia-
tors that are endowed with a long-term perspective. By con-
tinuing along this trajectory, negotiation research can address
perhaps the biggest challenge of all: a co-active approach that
simultaneously advances the autonomy of a negotiation agent
in all its aspects.
Finally, looking even further forward, it is worth noting
that people negotiate differently through intermediaries than
they would face-to-face. The literature on representation ef-
fects suggests that people may show less regard for fairness
and ethical behavior when negotiating through a third (hu-
man) party [Chugh et al., 2005]. Indeed, human lawyers are
ethically permitted and, to some extent, expected to lie on
behalf of their clients [Gratch et al., 2016]. This raises the
question as to whether agents should similarly lie on behalf
of a user, e.g. by using argumentation and persuasion tech-
nology [Dimopoulos and Moraitis, 2014]. Analogous to re-
cent research on ethical dilemmas in self-driving cars, people
may claim that negotiation agents should be ethical, but sac-
rifice these ideals if it maximizes their profits. The natural di-
chotomy between recognizing the agent’s autonomy and tak-
ing responsibility for its actions is best resolved by acknowl-
edging user responsibility for the agent’s design objectives
(what should be achieved) and principles (how it should be
achieved). This also illustrates an additional impetus for hav-
ing humans understand the agent: feeling responsibility for
the agent’s actions implies an understanding what the agent is
doing. Fortunately, some recent research on agent negotiators
suggests that people may act more ethically when negotiating
via computer agents [de Melo et al., 2016], but far more re-
search is needed to understand how artificial representation
effects arise.
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